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Abstract 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a well-studied game, with 
much information available about successful strategies. 
In this work we explore how players make decisions 
within an iterative version of the game, played against 
varying opponents in a closed environment. We present 
an app-facilitated social deduction game for eight or 
more players based upon the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). 
Players sat along a table and played PD, with the 
results causing players to move up or down the table, 
potentially facing a new opponent each round. We 
highlight which sources of information were most 
important to players when deciding whether to betray 
or cooperate, as well as deciding whether their 
opponent was trustworthy. Based upon player-reported 
data, we find players used five sources of information 
in the social deduction game. Data suggests that facts 
provided to players about their opponents are often 
overlooked in favour of information gained during social 
interaction or from events that occurred previously in 
the game.  
Author Keywords 
Social deduction game; trust game; game theory; 
strategy; prisoners dilemma; decision making.  
CSS Concepts 
• Human-centered computing~Empirical studies 
in collaborative and social computing 
Introduction 
Social deduction games are a popular genre of table-
top games. Players aim to determine the correct course 
of action based on potentially misleading data given to 
them by their fellow players. Knowing when to trust an 
opponent and when to be wary is the key to success. 
But how do players make this choice? What sources of 
data do people rely on when making such decisions in 
social deduction games? In this work, we explore how 
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 players make decisions in a social deduction game and 
which sources of information in the game help players 
to make those choices.  
To investigate this question, we developed the game 
“Axelrod”, a purpose built, app-facilitated social 
deception game based upon the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In 
the game, players sit opposite their opponent in two 
long lines either side of a table. Each round, the players 
have a discussion with the player across the table and 
then must choose to cooperate or defect. Based on the 
results, players gain or lose a number of points and 
potentially move up or down the table based on their 
place in the leader board. Players decisions throughout 
the game are collected through a web app running on 
each players’ phone. The app collected data about 
cooperation/defection, player scores, and prompts the 
players to report on why they have made each 
decision. Each side of the table may move in an 
asymmetrical fashion, resulting in new player pairings 
for the following round. The winner is the player in the 
top seat with the most points at the end of the final 
round. 
At the half-way point, some players are shown selective 
facts (Game facts) about the game, such as their 
opponent's voting history, their opponent’s 
justifications for decisions or the score of the person 
one seat up or down from them. This added to the 
potential data sources that players had at their disposal 
when deciding on the strategy they would use during 
the game.  
During each round, participants have a number of 
choices available to them. Do they want to betray or 
cooperate with their opponent? Do they want to 
attempt to deceive their opponent? Do they trust what 
their opponent is telling them? Past research has shown 
that whilst personality can determine a player’s 
decisions within the game [4], a number of external 
social cues can also affect these decisions including 
having empathy for your opponent [3] or fearing 
ostracism from a group [9].  
In this paper we aim to explore which information 
players choose to rely on most when playing a social 
deduction game – will players rely upon the facts 
provided by the app, or will they rely upon their own 
intuition and social interaction? 
Related Literature 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a game which is often 
used to model a strategic interaction between two 
players, and demonstrates why two players may not 
cooperate even when doing so looks like the most 
rational choice. In the game, players can choose to 
either cooperate or defect. A defection results in a 
higher payoff than cooperation, unless both players 
defect in which case both do worse than if they had 
cooperated. When played iteratively, the players can 
start to learn their opponents’ strategies and can begin 
to inform their own decisions based on this information 
(See [2] for a review of strategies). 
When a game of iterated prisoner's dilemma is played 
by human agents, there are additional factors that may 
impact the decision to cooperate or defect. Research 
has shown that characteristics such as empathy can 
increase levels of cooperation in game [3]. 
 
Figure 1: Axelrod player 
interface. Players are asked to 
choose a move and justify it and 
guess what their opponent will do 
and justify it. The round counter 
and score are shown at the 
bottom of the screen. 
 
 
 Social Deduction in Entertainment 
The Betrayer's Banquet [1] is an experiential dining 
game based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Players 
are invited to sit at a dining table for a meal. The food 
at the head of the table is significantly nicer than that 
offered at the foot of the table. Diners play a round of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the player across the table 
and then move up or down depending on whether they 
cooperated or betrayed. This experience highlights how 
the iterative Prisoners Dilemma can be used to create 
an entertaining game within a group.  
In The Justice Syndicate [6] - an interactive 
performance piece by ex-theatre company fanSHEN – 
players are based in a “courtroom” where they must 
act as jurors, deciding the fate of an accused surgeon. 
Players make decisions based upon the information 
given to them via an app which supports the game. 
Game admins run real-time analysis to determine which 
information should be provided to certain players, in an 
attempt to alter their verdicts. This work suggests that 
player choice can be altered by being given facts about 
the situation in which they find themselves a player. 
Decision making in Social Deduction Games  
The Ultimatum game, like PD is an example of a social 
cooperation game. Research has suggested that having 
information about an opponent’s past actions can affect 
a player’s decisions [5,10], as can being given general 
information on common strategies [11]. Other research 
has shown that limiting the topics of communication for 
players in the pre-game phase can lead to different 
decision making [12]. This work suggests it is possible 
to alter the players’ decision-making process by 
changing certain conditions.  
Method 
A web-based application was developed to support the 
game (See figure 1). The app had a number of features 
within the game: 
1. Present players with the choice to cooperate or 
defect 
2. Ask players why they made that decision 
3. Ask players to predict what their opponent 
would do and provide reasoning 
4. Show game facts to players 
Procedure 
Players were randomly allocated a seat around a long 
table. There were equal numbers of players on each 
side of the table, and each player had a clearly 
assigned “opponent” seated opposite them.  
Players were asked to navigate to the game app via a 
browser on their phone. In the first instance, players 
were asked to choose a username for themselves. The 
game master then explained the rules of the game to 
players and then the rounds of the game began. 
Players were allowed 1 minute to have a discussion 
with their opponent in each round. They were 
encouraged to use this time to “work out” what their 
actions they would take. Players were then asked to 
choose to cooperate or defect. To indicate this, users 
would input their choice on the app. This step was done 
in silence and took up to 30 seconds to complete.  
Half way through the games, half of the players were 
given a fact about their new opponent at the start of 
the round via the app. The type of fact provided was 
randomly chosen. There were six fact types offered:  
 • Last 3 rounds told the player what their 
opponent had done in the last 3 rounds and 
their reasoning. 
• Full voting history showed the opponent’s 
voting history for the entirety of the game. 
• Full seat history showed the opponent’s seat 
positions throughout the game. 
• Percentage showed an overall percentage of 
how often the opponent had defected. 
• Score of neighbouring seats showed the scores 
of players either side 
• Opponent score showed the opponent’s current 
score. 
Players were given scores varying from -2 to 2 
depending on the result of their actions. Figure 2 shows 
these allocations. Depending on their overall score, 
players were moved up and down the table so that all 
players were sitting in score order. Players did not 
move across the table.  
Participants 
Four games of Axelrod were played, Game 1 was eight 
rounds long, after which it was decided that more 
rounds could be added to make the game more 
engaging. Games 2 and 3 were 14 rounds long. Game 4 
was eight rounds long due to time constraints.  
Games 1, 2 and 3 had 10 players, Game 4 had 14. A 
total of 33 distinct players were involved in the games 
(11 players took part in more than one game). Players 
ages ranged from 18 to 45+. Some players had 
experience playing social deception games previously 
(eg Werewolf) whereas others had none. 
Results 
The percentage of cooperate decisions across all four 
games ranged from 65% to 84% (M=71%, SD=10%). 
Players in the game expected their opponents to vote 
to cooperate between 57% to 66% of the time 
(M=61%, SD=4%). 
 
Figure 2: Defection matrix for players in Axelrod 
Players guessed their opponent’s move correctly 
between 66% and 81% of the time (M=72%, SD=4%). 
In cases where a player had incorrectly predicted their 
opponent’s move, in 48%-86% (M=68%, SD=17%) of 
cases, the player guessed their opponent would defect 
when in fact they cooperated.  
Evaluation 
Strategies 
Players appear to be pessimistic in their expectations of 
their opponents – more frequently when a player 
predicted their opponent’s actions incorrectly, it was 
because they expected their opponent would defect 
when in fact they cooperated. 
It was difficult to determine strategies that players had 
throughout the game. Some players reported a tit-for-
tat style of play stating that they would “Cooperate 
 until betrayed” (Game 3 Player E). Many players 
appeared to use changing strategies depending upon 
their location on the table. 
Despite being given no further advice than that the top 
of the table was the “best” and the bottom the “worst”, 
some players appeared to take it upon themselves to 
form short, dynamic teams with their opponent. 
Multiple players reported in game that they were either 
both trying to move up the table together, or players 
were making strategic decisions for one to defect whilst 
the other cooperated in order to increase the point 
delta with a player in a seat below. One player stated 
their reason to betray their opponent was an 
“agreement to screw over the guy to the left” (G4PF), a 
strategy which was confirmed by their opponent.  
This team-forming behaviour led to a new strategy that 
we observed in this game which was a result of the 
iterative, yet multiple opponent ecosystem that was 
used in the game. The “Protect” strategy is used by a 
player when they are sat at the top of the table and 
want to protect their seat. This resulted in players 
cooperating with one another until another player in the 
seat below got too close in points, at which point the 
two top players would adapt a betray strategy to get 
one of them the points needed to get away from the 
contender. This led to players making decisions in order 
to “protect [their] position” (G3PA). 
At the other end of the table there were player “teams” 
who had decided that neither of them were getting out 
of the bottom seat, and as such it would be fun to try 
and get as few points as possible, thus taking the 
“Always Defect” strategy in order to minimize their 
scores. With G4PJ explaining they were taking part in 
“a suicide pact basically”. 
Making Decisions 
Players were asked to report on how they had made 
the decision to defect or cooperate after the votes had 
been cast but before they had been revealed. These 
short text answers were coded by two researchers 
separately to understand what information players were 
using when making decisions in the game.  
After coding the data, five sources of information 
emerged from the player reported data: Current data, 
Observed Data, Historical Data, Meta Data and 
Provided Data. Below we elaborate on each data source 
and provide a figure explaining how many decisions in 
the 4 games relied upon this particular data source.  
Current Data (23.3%) was data that players has 
gleaned from the conversation with their opponent prior 
to voting that round. This would include simple reasons 
such as their opponent telling them what their choice 
would be, “He claimed that he will” (G1PB) to sharing 
strategies “Neither of us want negative points” (G3PC). 
Historical data (8.1%) was used when a player made 
a decision based on previous events in the game. One 
example of this was when a player had faced an 
opponent previously in the game and remembered their 
actions. This worked both ways, some players decided 
to seek revenge for previous actions “She has already 
betrayed me” (G3PE) whereas others chose to trust a 
player based on a previous positive interaction “We 
cooperated last time” (G4PT). Other players used 
historical data on their own performance to help them 
make the decision “I keep losing” (G1PA). 
 Meta data (4.4%) included information that players 
had obtained from outside the game itself. This might 
include information from previous games, or social 
interactions between players who knew each other 
outside of the game. In these instances players could 
make assessments about a person’s trustworthiness 
based on their prior social interactions “Who would 
trust [player]?” (G1PL). It was not always the case that 
players allowed social history to affect the game play, 
some were keen to not let game play affect their 
relationship “we chose to do it out of trust for our 
friendship's history” (G2PS). 
Observed Data (3.4%) included information that 
players had determined based on the movement of 
their opponent during the game. If suddenly they 
observed their opponent move up multiple seats to 
meet them, then they could determine that it was likely 
the opponent had just betrayed the previous player 
they were set against “I know he [betrayed] last time-
he went up 2” (G4PN). 
Provided data (2.3%) were the facts given to players 
via the app during the game (see Method). For 
example, a player was told via the app about their 
opponent’s strategy of always defecting and decided 
they would have to take a similar approach “Because 
they are defecting and I'm taking them down” (G3PL). 
Primarily players appear to rely on Current data to 
decide how to play that round, using the conversations 
that they have just had with the player to determine 
whether or not they could be trusted. Historical data 
were used less frequently, but players still clearly relied 
on this in-game information to inform their decisions. 
Meta data and Observed data were infrequently used, 
and was not something that could be controlled within 
the game by the game master (GM). The data set that 
could be controlled by the GM was the Provided Data. 
This data was also not commonly used by players, with 
very few of them reporting that the facts they were 
shown affected their decisions.  
Conclusion 
Whereas we hypothesized that providing objective data 
to players might affect the strategies they chose, it 
appears more commonly that players relied upon their 
own experiences in the played game.  
The cause of this might be that players did not trust the 
facts that were provided to them, preferring to use 
their own data sources. Or it could be that the facts 
provided to them were not used consistently (they were 
only given to half of players for half of the game) 
meaning that players did not get used to checking 
them.  
Future Work 
Future work will aim to validate these data sources in 
other technologically mediated social deduction games 
to explore whether they are seen in games beyond 
those set around the Prisoners Dilemma.  
We also aim to explore how the Provided Data can be 
presented differently to encourage more user 
engagement. And subsequently to understand why 
users choose to prioritise some sources of data over 
others.  
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